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H. Wade MacLauchlan*

Some Problems with Judicial
Review of Administrative
Inconsistency

In a 1982 law review article Professor David Mullan proposes that
we adopt the identification of inconsistency as a basis for judicial
review of administrative action. 1 On its surface such a proposal may
not seem revolutionary. The concept of precedent and rule-oriented
decision-making is fundamental to common notions of justice.
Arbitrariness in official action offends the rule of law. Hence to
resist such a proposal may not seem at the outset a very popular
task, especially if the alternative is to tolerate inconsistent
administrative action.
But it is not the popularity or the unpopularity of the undertaking
which is troubling, so much as its ambiguity. Mullan's work draws
upon the "relatively precise principle" that like cases should be
treated alike. For my part, I find this precision elusive. The role of
consistency in the process of judicial decision-making is
controversial. 2 When considered in the administrative law setting
the difficulties of overseeing inconsistency within an exceptional,
deferential model of judicial review are manifold.
The irony of Professor Mullan's proposal is that it emerges in the
context of a work devoted to resisting attempts to extend
intra-jurisdictional review, specifically through the development of
a doctrine of substantive fairness. Says Mullan of substantive
3
fairness, such review would be "dangerous and unnecessary"
because it would involve an "open-ended standard ' 4 providing an
opportunity for judges to "second-guess" 5 statutory authorities.
*Assistant Professor of Law, Dalhousie University
1. "Natural Justice and Fairness - Substantive as well as procedural Standards
for the Review of Administrative Decision-Making" (1982), 27 McGill L.J. 250.
2. See e.g., K. Llewellyn, The Common Law Tradition (Boston, Toronto: Little,
Brown & Co., 1960); B. Cardozo, The Nature of the JudicialProcess(New Haven:
Yale Press, 1931); J.Stone, Legal Systems and Lawyers' Reasonings (Stanford:
Stanford University Press, 1964); R. Wasserstrom, The Judicial Decision
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1961); A.T. Denning, From Precedent to
Precedent(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1959).
3. Supra, note 1, at 280.
4. Id., at 274.
5. Id., at 275.
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Two of the reasons put forward for rejecting such a development are
that it would contradict the legislative preference for administrative
mechanisms and that it would negate the advantage of the
comparative expertise of the statutory decision-maker. Inconsistency, by contrast, is said to be a "relatively precise principle" 6
which "is not likely to present a threat to the autonomy of
administrative agencies." 7 It is my view that the concept of treating
like cases alike is not at all precise as a criterion of judicial review
and that it is every bit as open-ended as the substantive unfairness
which Mullan rejects.
It must be stated that Professor Mullan acknowledges the need for
some qualification on the reach of his proposed principle of review.
He recognizes the need for flexibility in policy development and the
danger of perpetuation of erroneous decisions. In the end the target
is admittedly an ambiguous one; but it is perhaps this ambiguity
more than the prospect of anyone taking seriously a proposal of
rigid consistency which prompts a response. My position simply
stated is this: we do not presently have in Canada a separate ground
of judicial review for inconsistency nor do we need one, however
qualified. All of our existing bases of review adhere to a
jurisdictional model, complete with the deference implicit in such a
concept. There is no such deference implied by the broad language
of inconsistency and any effort to articulate a qualified version
would be a futile attempt to navigate the slippery slope between
jurisdictional review and plenary revision, with the inevitable result
being tantamount to appellate review.
To reject inconsistency as an independent ground of review is not
however to condone administrative treatment which is apparently
inconsistent. While maintaining a jurisdictional model of review we
may still supervise the most blatant inconsistencies by treating them
as evidence of abuse of discretion or bias. 8 Professor Mullan even
suggests that review for inconsistency may be nothing more than a
particular case of reviewing abuse of discretion. 9 But this latter

6. Id., at 287.
7. Id., at 286.
8. This view is shared by Professor Mullan in a previous article in which he rejects
inconsistency as a separate ground of review, saying that this "is the kind of
judicial review we do not want." "Recent Developments in Nova Scotian
Administrative Law" (1978), 4 Dal. L.J. 467, at 538.
9. Supra, note 1,at 296.

Some Problems with Judicial Review 437

concept has always had a jurisdictional format,' 0 and it is
considerably more modest in its theoretical underpinnings than is
the notion that judges should ensure that like cases be treated alike.
The proper response to administrative action which is ostensibly
inconsistent but which falls short of traditional jurisdictional
grounds of review is not judicial oversight, but the exertion of
pressure in the political dynamic, of which the administrative
decision-maker forms a vital element.
Professor Mullan also supports his proposal by reference to
American judicial review. It is said that a requirement of
consistency as developed in American cases is "an implied
limitation on the exercise of statutory discretions generally."" This
paper will show that the American principle is not nearly so general
in scope and that it may only be a particular manifestation of a
requirement of reasoned decision-making. It will be argued that two
cases relied upon by Mullan which purport to found a consistency
requirement on constitutional grounds are wrong. Moreover, even
assuming the American jurisprudence to be as sophisticated and
far-reaching as Mullan states it, there remains a danger in
selectively borrowing from their experience. It is important to
undertake comparative judicial review in a comprehensive light. In
this case it will be seen that American developments diverge
significantly from those in Canada and that we must be very
cautious when relying upon their precedents.
Ultimately I concur in the general tenor of Professor Mullan's
article which is to favour a cautious and restrained model of judicial
review and to reject a principle of substantive fairness. I also concur
in his view that "there is still obviously much room for thought and
refinement of language."1 2 What follows, I hope, will contribute to
that process.
I. The Problem of "Consistency"
The initial and indeed the central problem in this analysis is to
determine what is meant by consistency. The Mullan proposal is
10. See Mullan, Administrative Law (2d ed. Agincourt: Carswell, 1979), at 3-165
where he says that abuse of discretion is "a further aspect of jurisdiction or vires."
Also Roncarelli v. Duplessis, [1959] S.C.R. 121 at 140 (per Rand J.) and 158 (per
Martland J,); Smith and Rhuland Ltd. v. The Queen, [1953] 2 S.C.R. 95 at 100
(per Rand J.).
11. Supra, note 1, at 282.
12. Id., at 298.
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said to be "based on the reasonably precise principle underlying
much of our legal thinking that like cases be treated alike."' 13 It
would be worthwhile at this point to consider just how precise is this
principle and how much of our legal thinking it underlies. The
durability of the concept cannot be gainsaid. It has descended in
virtually literal form from the work of Aristotle. Chaim Perelman
writes: "from Plato and Aristotle, through St. Thomas Aquinas,
down to the jurists, moralists and philosophers of our own day runs
a thread of universal agreement on this point." 14
But Perelman was not impressed by the durability of the concept
so much as by its flexibility or, one might say, malleability. He
wrote of the importance of "an indeterminate element, a variable
whose various specific applications will produce the most
contrasting formulas of justice."1 5 To Perelman and those of the
Belgian school, legal argument was not a matter of formal logic but
of rhetoric: "[A legal argument] is not correct and compelling or
incorrect and valueless, but is relevant or irrelevant, strong or weak,
in accordance with the reasons that justify its use under the
circumstances."16

Julius Stone was even more skeptical than Perelman in his
rejection of consistency as a governing principle in legal argument.
He wrote that the effect of simplifying justice into equality is "to
conceal, truncate, foreclose or disguise by fictional or ambiguous
17
formula the range of values involved in justice-controversies.'
Professor Weston, in a recent article in the Harvard Law Review,
concludes that the concept of equality is entirely circular:
So there it is: equality is entirely circular: It tells us to treat like
people alike; but when we ask who 'like people' are, we are told
'people who should be treated alike'. 18

13. Id., at 286.
14. The Idea of Justice and the Problem of Argument, trans. J. Petrie (London:
Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1963), at 12.
15. Id.
16. "Logique formelle, logiquejuridique" (1960), 11-12 Logique et Analyse 226,
at 228.
17. "Justice Not Equality" in E. Kamenka and A. Tay eds., Justice (New York:
St. Martin's Press, 1980), at 114-15.
18. "The Empty Idea of Equality" (1982), 95 Harv. Law Rev. 537, at 547. Cf.,
K. Greenawalt, "How Empty is the Idea of Equality?" (1983), 83 Col. L. Rev.
1167; and K. Karst, "Why Equality Matters" (1983), 17 Ga. L. Rev. 245. See the
response by Weston in "To Lure the Tarantula from its Hole: A Response"
(1983), 83 Col. L. Rev. 1186.
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Notwithstanding its admitted ambiguity the concept of treating
like cases alike retains a superficial appeal as a prescription for
justice. It is a clich6 of the judicial process. It recurs with varying
emphases in the writings of legal theorists. 19 It has recently been
suggested that the two rules of natural justice derive from this
'20
"formal maxim."
The conclusion of writers like Jerome Frank and Stone that the
judicial device of precedent is not scientific can hardly be disputed.
But it is not then necessary to conclude that it is an entirely empty
or tautological concept. In concluding that the precedential system,
once found to be unscientific, is irrational, Richard Wasserstrom
says realist thinkers fall into the trap of the "irrationalistic
fallacy." 2 1 The concept cannot be entirely empty. Arguments about
consistent treatment and reasoned applications of rules are, after all,
the stock-in-trade of the legal profession.
Some very helpful work has been done on this problem by Gidon
Gottlieb who, like Wasserstrom, rejected the irrationalistic
fallacy. 2 2 Gottlieb considered rule-based argument to be a new form
23
of logic, not scientific, but, as he called it, "a working logic." It
was, said Gottlieb, "field-dependent." Central to this form of
reasoning were necessary connections between rules and other
elements of the separate logical texture which "are necessarily
involved in the application of such rules." 24 According to this
approach, the soundness or rationality of a particular decision can
be tested by two principal measures, consistency of treatment and
conformity with operative purposes and policies. So at this point
one is left to wonder whether Gottlieb's refutation of the
irrationalistic fallacy of the realists doesn't ultimately confirm it.
The attempt to break out of the circularity of treating like cases alike
may itself conclude in a tautology. But there are two elements in his
19. E.g., H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1961), at
155-6; J. Rawls, A Theory ofJustice (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 1971), at 237; R.
Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, (London: Duckworth, 1978), at 113. It should
be noted however that none of these writers asserts the Aristotelian concept as a
prescription for justice. Rawls immediately qualifies by saying: "to be sure, this
notion does not take us very far." Hart says: "it is by itself incomplete, and until
supplemented, cannot afford any determinate guide to conduct."
20. R.A. MacDonald, "Judicial Review and Procedural Fairness in Administrative Law: I" (1980), 25 McGill L.J. 520, at 542.
21. Wasserstrom, supra, note 2, at 23.
22. The Logic of Choice (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1968), at 23-4.
23. Id., at 169.
24. Id., emphasis that of Gottlieb.
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work which show a tentative way out. The first is his recognition of
the field-dependent nature of legal reasoning, the importance of
rules as applied. The second is his conclusion that rule-guided
choices and decisions "ideally must rest upon deference to
25
preferred balancings between rival purposes and policies."
This notion of deference to preferred balancings is crucial to
understanding legal reasoning and especially to dealing with a
proposal that judges review inconsistent administrative decisions.
To illustrate, if I appear before an administrator to persuade him that
"consistency" compels a particular outcome in a case, I must
present my argument as follows:
(i)There is a precedent or a series of precedents which have been
decided according to an asserted rule;
(ii) The rule was and continues to be sound on its political merits;
(iii) The actual case is similar to the claimed precedents in the
relevant respects and hence should be treated alike.
Whether the administrator is being asked to depart from an existing
"rule" on the ground that it was or is politically inappropriate or to
perform what lawyers may consider the more mundane task of
disfinguishing the claimed precedent, there is an indispensable
element of choice. This element is just as potent at the stage of
marshalling facts to compare the cases as it is when deciding upon
the appropriate rule. At each stage the official will decide according
to his perception of the circumstances and of prevailing political
exigencies. The question will never be: "What does consistency as
an objective principle compel us to do?" Rather it is: "What is the
most rational choice to make in the circumstances?" And,
confronted with a challenge to the validity of an administrator's
decision through an application to a reviewing judge, the ultimate
question is: "Who should decide?"
In the end the question will be, as Gottlieb concluded, one of
deference. Legal argument is potentially endless. And it cannot be
terminated by hand-waving references to "consistency". It can
only be terminated by a decision from the appropriate authority.
Consistency is one argument to put before the decision-maker, to be
weighed in good faith. But ultimately we must acknowledge, as did
Perelman, that "strong arguments and good reasons are the strong

25. Id., at 172.
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arguments and reasons for the one who is to be convinced." 26 The
administrative, like the judicial, process is about making decisions.
Disappointed parties and even more objective observers can argue
about whether two cases have been treated consistently. But only
the designated decision-maker, fully informed and acting for proper
and impartial purposes, can know whether a decision is or is not
consistent with the cited precedent.
So we conclude that consistency, like reasonableness, is
something about which we can have intuitive feelings and make
analogical arguments but still disagree. As Perelman concluded we
can argue about it rhetorically but not scientifically. And, as found
by Gottlieb, it comes down to a recognition that this type of
decision-making process is a "working logic." It is a matter of
applying rules, or principles, to facts. The essence of the matter is
not to determine in some scientific fashion whether a decision is
consistent with a claimed precedent but to determine who should
decide.
I. The Problem with JudicialReview
Normally we believe that we have a restricted model of judicial
review in Canada which defers to the expertise of the designated
official decision-maker. Indeed the endorsement of such a model is
the major premise of the Mullan article. However, Professor Mullan
says that review for inconsistency is based upon a "reasonably
precise principle" which "is not likely to present a threat to the
autonomy of administrative agencies." 2 7 It is not clear whether this
amounts to a claim that a consistency requirement can be enforced
without consideration of the merits of the agency's decision and is
hence merely procedural or whether it interprets consistency review
as falling into some half-way house between procedural and
substantive review. In either case the inference is that such judicial
oversight would stop short of an incursion into the autonomy of
agencies. Professor Mullan is not alone in making this qualification.
Richard Stewart suggests that such requirements are not directly
addressed to the substance of agency policy, only to ensuring "that

26. "Law Philosophy and Argumentation" in Justice, Law and Argument
(Dordrecht, Boston, London: Reidel, 1980), at 160. Emphasis added.
27. Supra, note 1, at 286.
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the agency's action is rationallyrelated to some permissible societal
28
goal."
It is difficult to believe that review for inconsistency can be
carried on without interfering with the autonomous decision-making
of the agency. This is especially true if the remanded decision is
challenged a second time around. A reference to the application of
the principle in the American case of Greyhound Corporation v.
ICC2 9 will demonstrate how non-deferential such review can be.
Under the Interstate Commerce Act, the ICC is empowered to treat
holding companies as carriers for purposes of the accounting,
reporting and security regulations of the Act if the holding company
acquires "control" of a carrier. In 1963 Greyhound Corporation
transferred its carrier operations to a subsidiary, Greyhound Lines,
but remained subject to the securities jurisdiction of the ICC since
the bus line continued to be its principal source of income (90%).
Beginning in 1963 the parent company diversified its holdings so
that carrier operations came to represent 20% and 40% of gross and
net income respectively. In 1972 the company petitioned the ICC to
be released from the securities jurisdiction. Previous to this time the
test which was consistently applied was whether the carrier
accounted for more than half of the parent company's gross income.
The ICC denied the petition, citing two justifications: Greyhound
controlled a major part of the busing industry, and the principal
sources of Greyhound Corporation's net income were transportation
related operations.
The company then challenged the ICC refusal claiming that the
decision in their case was inconsistent with the policy applied to
other carriers. The Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that the ICC
was duty bound to justify its standards and to explain the
co-existence of conflicting decisions. The order was remanded to
the Commission for elaboration of the factors justifying either a new
policy or a special application in the case of Greyhound. In
affirming its order the ICC cited four factors: the importance of the
carrier to the parent company, Greyhound's past record of corporate
28. "The Reformation of American Administrative Law" (1975), 88 Harv. L.
Rev. 1667, at 1680. When the comments of Professor Stewart are read in context
the intellectual ambivalence surrounding this discussion is plainly evident. A
requirement of consistency is said to not be "directly" addressed to substance.
Then it is said that it may "impact" on the substance. Finally it is referred to as an
additionalproceduralground.
29. 551 F.2d 414 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
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abuses, competing demands by other subsidiaries for the resources
of the parent company, and the state of the industry in general. In
the course of reaffirming its position the Commission accepted
comments from Greyhound, other carriers, and the Commission's
Bureau of Investigation and Enforcement. Greyhound again sought
judicial review on the basis of the inconsistency of the ICC's
interpretation of its securities jurisdiction. This time the D.C. Court
of Appeals considered each of the four factors enumerated by the
Commission and dismissed the first as contradicting the ICC's
position, the last two as "broad generalizations" and the point
regarding past abuses as, absent additional facts,
"unreasonable." 30 In the result the Court set aside the order
entirely, remarking that in eight years since the initial order the
Commission had had ample time to explain its deviation from prior
decision, and concluded that there was "no useful purpose to be
served in allowing the Commission another shot at the target.' 31 In
the face of such a critical review of the basis of the ICC's decision
and of the Court's failure to show any modicum of deference to the
agency decision, it is difficult to defend inconsistency review as
being something less than de novo consideration of the merits.
A second case illustrating the extent of such review is Office of
Communication of the United Church of Christ v. Federal
Communications Commission.3 2 The FCC is obliged to promulgate
Equal Employment Opportunity regulations but may do so within its
mandate to ensure that broadcasters serve all segments of the
community. In 1969 it adopted rules requiring stations with five or
more full-time employees to file reports respecting employment of
minorities. In 1976, after accepting comments from interested
parties, the threshold was raised by the FCC to stations with more
than ten employees. The stated reasons for the policy were:
inadequate Commission resources to process the reports; equal
opportunity programs were unenforceable against small stations
because they had no formal personnel procedures; the burden
imposed on small stations was unjustified; and the great majority of
industry employees would be covered in any event. The Second
30. 668 F.2d 1354 at 1361 (D.C. Cir. 1981). Only Judge Skelly Wright sat on both
cases. The other members of the court were different in each instance.
31. Id., at 1364.
32. 560 F.2d 529 (2d Cir. 1977). It is interesting to note that this case applies the
principles developed in the context of inconsistent adjudications to a rulemaking
proceeding.
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Circuit Court declined to accept the point regarding the agency's
resources because that same argument had been made in dissent at
the time of the 1969 rules but rejected by the majority of the FCC.
The Court observed that no evidence of strained agency resources
was presented by the FCC. In response to the point regarding the
informality of smaller stations, the Court could not see that this
factor had changed since 1969 and, furthermore, was of the view
that even in the case of small stations, such requirements were
"wholly reasonable". 33 The third point regarding the burden on
small stations was found to be unsupported by evidence and the
fourth point, that 85% of the industry's workforce remained subject
to the requirements, was responded to by some selective statistical
citations from the record. The decision by the Commission was
therefore quashed because the FCC had "failed to articulate a
34
reasoned explanation for its action."
What these cases illustrate is the lack of any objective limitations
on the exercise of judicial oversight of what the court considers to
be inconsistent decisions. 3 5 Notwithstanding reminders that courts
should be sensitive to the need for flexibility in administrative
policy development, such considerations can be reduced to pious
platitudes where a reviewing court is resolved on another
substantive outcome than the one chosen by the agency. So long as
the agency is only required to acknowledge its departure from an
established rule, the requirement of consistent treatment might be
said to be formal or procedural. But when the next step is taken to
require not only an explanation but one which the court accepts as
rational there can no longer be any pretence that the review is not
substantive. It is precisely that.
Not only does such review ignore any question of judicial
deference, it actually involves a presumption against the agency.
The agency effectively bears a burden of persuasion when it desires
to modify its policy. In addition it is confronted with the prospect
that a reviewing court may read its reasons selectively or, as
occurred in the Office of Communications case, go back into the
record to refer selectively to the evidence. Should it still be
contended that this amounts to less than substantive review because
33. Id., at 534.
34. Id., at 535.
35. See also Sunbeam Television Corp. v. FCC, 243 F.2d 26 (D.C. Cir. 1957)
where the Circuit Court of Appeals simply substituted its views for that of the
agency on the proper application of, not departure from, the FCC's precedents.
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the court doesn't actually substitute its view for that of the agency, it
might be responded that, so far from insulating the agency from the
court, this feature provides yet another device which expands the
role of the court. The agency's decision must stand the test of
rationality. The court is not similarly constrained; it need only find
that the departure of the agency is irrational. If the court were
obliged to explain why the status quo is more reasonable than the
change, it would at least be subjected to whatever objective
limitations are imposed by rationality itself. Under a regime where
it need only set aside or remand to the agency, the court has the
luxury of falling back on an implicit argument in favour of no
change, and so it can hardly be said that such a basis of review does
not encroach upon the autonomy of official decision-makers.
Professor Mullan admits a need for courts to be sensitive to
"various legitimate reasons for acting inconsistently and changing
policies.''36 He says that "frequent change" should be tolerated
where the agency has a broad policy mandate. In effect, what is
proposed is a requirement of consistency unless inconsistency is
justified in the view of the court. This is hardly the type of neutral
principle appropriate to the exceptional nature of judicial review.
Superior courts do not sit in appeal from administrative
decision-makers, they review excesses. By enabling courts to
effectively second-guess the tribunal on whether it should deviate
from precedent, the consequence, as has been seen, is an
independent review of the rationality of the agency decision. The
factors which the court will consider when reviewing the decision
are the same as those considered by the agency. 3 7 Judicial review
should be premised upon neutral principles which are capable of
being understood and acted upon by the agencies themselves.
Review for inconsistency, so far from being neutral or disengaged,
invites full judicial reconsideration of the administrative decision.
To undertake such an open-ended review would be for the courts
to effectively undermine the choice of the legislature in selecting
specialized tribunals to perform administrative functions. Administrators are given a political mandate to operate within a specified
jurisdiction and comprehended by that mandate is a legislative
preference for expeditious, relatively inexpensive and expert
decisions. To transform judicial review from supervision of
36. Supra, note 1, at 286.
37. See Mullan, supra, note 8, at 537-38.
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illegality into review for rationality would be to negate these
advantages and to foster vexatious litigation. It would add
substantially to the cost of the process and, by permitting delay,
would chill activity in the regulated sector. Moreover there is the
question of whether the courts are capable of assessing the
rationality of agency choices to deviate from past practice.
Supervisory courts have significant limitations of procedure which
might prevent them from considering subtleties which could
legitimately motivate the agency. Neither do courts have the benefit
of the agency's specialized experience. Finally, to admit such a
broad principle of review could impose such a strain on the limited
resources of superior courts as to jeopardize both the integrity and
the administrative functioning of the courts themselves.
I. The Problemof Precedentin AdministrativeLaw
Consistency is a desirable feature in administrative decisionmaking. It enables regulated parties to plan their affairs in an
atmosphere of stability and predictability. It impresses upon
officials the importance of objectivity and acts to prevent arbitrary
or irrational decisions. It fosters public confidence in the integrity of
the regulatory process. It exemplifies "common sense and good
administration." 38
Consistency of treatment implies that some kind of policy choice
has been made, that the decision-maker will deliberate the case at
hand in the broader context of policy development and implementation rather than disposing of the matter as an ad hoc isolated
determination. These are the advantages of consistency which have
prompted American writers such as Professor Davis 39 and
American courts4 0 to express a preference for rule-making over

38. H.N. Janisch, "Policy Making in Regulation" (1979), 17 Osgoode Hall L.J.
46, at 96.
39. K.C. Davis, DiscretionaryJustice: A Preliminary Inquiry (Baton Rouge:
Louisiana State University Press, 1968); D.L. Shapiro, "The Choice of
Rulemaking or Adjudication in the Development of Administrative Policy"
(1965), 78 Harv. L. Rev. 921; J. Skelly Wright, "Beyond Discretionary Justice"
Book Review (1972), 81 Yale L.J. 575; K. Kahn, "The NLRB and Higher
Education: The Failure of Policymaking through Adjudication" (1973), 21
U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 63; Note "The Federal Regulatory Agencies: A Need for Rules
of Decision" (1964), 50 Va. L. Rev. 652.
40. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194 at 202 (1947); StandardRate and Data
Service v. United States PostalService, 584 F.2d 473 at 482 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
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adjudication as a regulatory tool. A similar comprehensive approach
to policy development has been urged for Canadian regulators. 41
But an inflexible concept of consistent treatment following the
model of stare decisis would in principle be antithetical to the need
for individuated treatment which is the essence of administrative
law. As Professor Mullan pointed out in a 1978 article, the common
law of judicial review, through the development of a doctrine that
administrators should not fetter their discretion, has attempted "to
safeguard administrative tribunals from court-like tendencies with
respect to precedents. '"42 The tension between the need for
individual consideration and the danger of unprincipled decisionmaking is an eternal problem of administrative law, and a problem
which Canadian and English courts have not handled in a very
satisfactory fashion. There is a line of jurisprudence which has
resisted attempts by administrators to develop general rules if the
consequence would be something less than a full exercise of
discretion. The adoption of a requirement of consistent decisionmaking cannot be proceeded with before some attempt is made to
reconcile such a proposal with the principle that bodies vested with
43
discretionary powers must not fetter themselves.
The normal point of commencement for reviewing the issue of
fettering discretion is the judgment of Bankes L.J. in The King v.
PortofLondon Authority. Exp. Kynoch, Ltd.:
There are on the one hand cases where a tribunal in the honest
exercise of its discretion has adopted a policy, and, without
refusing to hear an applicant, intimates to him what its policy is,
and that after hearing him it will in accordance with its policy
decide against him, unless there is something exceptional in his
case ... [I]f the policy has been adopted for reasons which the
tribunal may legitimately entertain, no objection could be taken
to such a course. On the other hand there are cases where a
tribunal has passed a rule, or come to a determination, not to hear
any application of a particular character by whomsoever made.
There is44 a wide distinction to be drawn between these two
classes.

41. Janisch, supra, note 38.
42. Supra, note 8,at 537.
43. See: H.W.R. Wade, Administrative Law 5th ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1982), at 330-31.
It is a fundamental rule for the exercise of discretionary power that discretion
must be brought to bear on every case: each one must be considered on its own
merits and decided as the public interest requires at the time.
44. [1919] 1 K.B. 176 at 184 (C.A.).
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On its face the dictum of Bankes L.J. appears to amount only to a
requirement that the tribunal or official vested with a discretionary
power consider all cases individually. 4 5 However, it is readily
apparent that there is no "wide distinction" as suggested by Bankes
L.J. and that in reality there exists a considerable tension between a
requirement of individual treatment and the development of general
46
policies.
A good illustration of the narrow scope of what Molot calls the
channel between the Scylla of individuated adjudication and the
Charybdis of formal rule-making 4 7 can be found in the decision of
the Ontario Court of Appeal in Re HopedaleDevelopments Ltd. and
Town of Oakville. 4 8 In that case the Ontario Municipal Board had
power under the Planning Act to direct a municipality to amend a
by-law where the municipality refused to do so. 49 In a series of
previous decisions the Board had announced that it "should
decline" to interfere unless it was shown that the by-law was clearly
not for the common good, that it created undue hardship, that some
private right was unduly interfered with or denied, or that the
municipality had acted arbitrarily or otherwise improperly.
McGillivray J.A. concluded that the Board, by laying down such
principles, had reduced the scope of the inquiry and, had it disposed
of the case simply by applying those principles without considering
the individual merits of the application, would have been in error as
having "fettered its discretion." 50 Notwithstanding the opposition
of the Court to such fettering of discretion, McGillivray J.A. also
referred to a commentary in de Smith to the effect that it is

45. In British Oxygen Co. Ltd. v. Minister of Technology, [1971] A.C. 610 at 625,
Lord Reid commented on the excerpt from Kynoch: "But the circumstances in
which discretions are exercised vary enormously and that passage cannot be applied
literally in every case. The general rule is that anyone who has to exercise a

statutory discretion must not "shut his ears to an application" (to adapt from
Bankes L.J. on p. 183). ...What the authority must not do is to refuse to listen at
all." See also Stringer v. Minister of Housing, [1971] 1 All E.R. 65 at 80, per
Cooke J.
46. See: H.L. Molot, "The Self-Created Rule of Policy and Other Ways of
Exercising Administrative Discretion (1972), 18 McGill L.J. 310; D.J. Galligan,
"The Nature and Function of Policies Within Discretionary Power", [1976] Public
Law 332.
47. Molot, id., at 330.
48. [1965] O.R. 259 (C.A.).
49. R.S.O. 1960, c. 296, s. 30(19).
50. [1965] O.R. 259 at 265 (C.A.).
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"obviously desirable" to openly state general principles by which a
tribunal intends to be guided in the exercise of its discretion. 5 1
It is not immediately evident that the two positions can be
reconciled. The bottom line is that it is desirable to have open
general policies but the tribunal falls into error when it dismisses the
application on the basis of its policy. In the end the most likely
construction to be put on Hopedale is that a tribunal falls into error
when it automatically or slavishly applies a declared policy without
considering whether the application in question might raise unique
considerations. 52 Such an approach can also be found in a decision
of the British Columbia Court of Appeal in a case where the
Superintendent of Motor Vehicles suspended a driver's license
automatically upon conviction for impaired driving. The policy was
admitted to be a "blanket" approach to all persons so convicted.
The B.C. Court quashed the suspension on the ground that the
Superintendent had failed to exercise his discretion by not
addressing the issue of the fitness of the particular driver. 5 3 The
Nova Scotia Court of Appeal has recently quashed a decision of the
provincial Rent Review Commission where that decision was based
on internal guidelines. While the claimed breach of natural justice
was the non-disclosure of the guidelines to affected landlords, Mr.
Justice MacDonald made the passing observation that: "Nonregulation guidelines become objectionable, however, if they have
the effect of predetermining the matters in issue. To some extent the
guidelines appear to have had that effect in this case." 54
While these cases admit the competence of tribunals and
administrative officials to develop policy guidelines they clearly
51. See: deSmith's JudicialReview of AdministrativeAction, ed. J.M. Evans, 4th
ed. (London: Stevens and Sons, 1980), at 313.
52. See Mullan, Administrative Law, supra, note 10, at 3-166: "[D]iscretion
should be exercised in relation to each individual matter coming before the
decision-maker and should not be automatically determined or even fettered by
reason of a rigid policy laid down in advance. Of course, the laying down of
general guidelines and principles for future action by a statutory decision-maker is
not objectionable so long as it still considers the merits of each individual matter for
decision in the light of those guidelines and principles and is prepared to admit of
exceptions to the general policy in appropriate cases."
53. Lloyd v. Superintendent of Motor Vehicles, [1971] 3 W.W.R. 619 at 626-7

(B.C.C.A.).

54. Dale Corporation v. The Rent Review Commission and the Tenants of the
Welsford (1983), 58 N.S.R. (2d) 138. See a case comment by A. Wayne MacKay,
"The Dale Corporationv. Rent Review Commission: 'Secrecy Rebuked' (1983),
1 Admin. L.R.
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eschew rigidity and prohibit a narrowing of discretion. 5 5 The
question which this raises for the present discussion is whether it is
realistic to call upon courts to recognize a principle of judicial
review requiring consistency when those same courts are prepared
to quash administrative decisions which adhere automatically to
predetermined policies. Such a proposal has the double handicap of
fettering the discretion of tribunals and of being itself inconsistent.
Either one value, consistency, or the other, full exercise of
discretion, must yield. For the present, English and Canadian courts
apparently exalt the latter. 56 At the very least a proposed
endorsement of judicially enforced consistency must come to terms
with this line of jurisprudence. It presents a threshold impediment to
the introduction of such a principle.
Even if it is assumed that the common law can be rationalized so
that the principle against fettering discretion applies only where the
decision-maker refuses to consider an individual case and bases that
refusal on a pre-existing policy, the problem of precedent in
administrative law will not be resolved. After all, behind the
common law principle there is a concern for the process.
Underlying this concern is a recognition that official decisionmakers are often given mandates which require a flexible and
dynamic treatment of a particular subject matter. Their nature is to
make choices which are sensitive to the dictates of social policy,
and in this way their process necessarily deviates from the
rule-conscious model of the ordinary courts. The concept of
precedent is of greatest value in the case of the ordinary courts, but
57
even there the strictures of stare decisis have been moderated.
Between adjudications in the ordinary courts and administrative
55. See Hopedale, supra, note 48, at 265: "To lay them down as principles by
which the Board would be guided may therefore be both reasonable and wise but to
say that the appellant must comply with them before the Board will allow the
application is clearly wrong and the Board, if it so fettered its jurisdiction; would be
in error." Emphasis that of McGillivray J.A. See also Capital Cities
Communications,Inc. V. CRTC (1977), 81 D.L.R. (3d) 609, at 629 (S.C.C.).
56. See Merchandise Transport Ltd. v. British Transport Commission,[1962] 2
Q.B. 173, at 193,per Devlin L.J.: "[A] tribunal must not pursue consistency at the
expense of the merits of individual cases. If the discretion is to be narrowed, that
must be done by statute; the tribunal has no power to give its decisions the force of
statute." For the American position on fettering discretion, see note 138 infra.
57. See the opinion of Dickson J. for the majority of the Supreme Court in
Ministerof Indian Affairs and NorthernDevelopment v. Ranville (1982), 44 N.R.
616. For general discussion, see J.D. Murphy and R. Rueter, Stare Decisis in
Commonwealth Appellate Courts (Toronto: Butterworth's, 1981).
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action generally, there exists the critical distinction that administrators, even those most closely resembling a court model, are
expressly charged with a policy-making function. Lon Fuller
recognized this generic difference by declining to extend his internal
morality of law to all administrative decisions. This he said would
be to extend it "beyond its proper domain.' 58 Fuller believed that
to attempt the tasks of economic allocation within such formal limits
would be "certain to result in inefficiency, hypocrisy, moral
confusion and frustration.' ' 59 Even Aristotle, the source of much
inspiration for advocates of equality, recognized that flexibility was
to be preferred in the application of law where general principles
were incapable of comprehending the details. 60 This is not to deny
the value of consistency in such cases. Instead it is meant to
underline the risks of treating the arid legal reasoning of appellate
judges as the only model for testing consistency. This point was
recognized early in the development of modem administrative
tribunals by Dean Roscoe Pound who expressed a fear that
administrative decision-makers would fall into the same precedential trap as did nineteenth century equity judges:
No one can deny that there are dangers involved in committing
the application of legal standards to administrative bodies. One
danger is that they will do what courts have done before them:
crystallize particular applications to particular cases into rules
and thus deny the standard. More than one court attempted this in
the law of negligence and American courts of equity in the
nineteenth century did much toward turning experience in the
chancellor's foot into hard and fast rules of
exercise of 6the
1
jurisdiction.
Furthermore, there may be administrative tasks which appear to
resist a model of consistent treatment. If one talks of a general
principle of consistency then it could extend to such cases as a
58. The Morality of Law (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1964), at 170.
59. Id., at 173.
60. Politics, Book II, Chap. 16. 1287b. (Jowett trans.) "But some things can, and
other things cannot, be comprehended under the law, and this is the origin of the
vexed question whether the best law or the best man should rule. For matters of
detail about which men deliberate cannot be included in legislation. Nor does
anyone deny that the decision of such matters must be left to man. . ." For an
interpretation of Aristotle in the modem administrative context, see J. Frank, If
Men Were Angels (New York: Harper, 1942) where Frank concludes that Aristotle
was not hostile to what today we call administrative discretion, (at 193-209, esp.

203).
61. "The Administrative Application of Legal Standards" (1919), 44 A.B.A.
Rep. 445, at 463-64.
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decision by a customs officer to open a piece of luggage or by a
police officer to question witnesses. These latter functions are
hardly susceptible to a requirement of consistency as, especially in
the case of the customs official, random action may be the essence
of the task. Similarly with prosecutors, selective prosecution may
be necessary in light of scarce resources, discrete perceptions of
62
community interest, or the presence of mitigating circumstances.
Assuming that the range of administrative functions could be set
out on a spectrum depicting them in order of the respective value
which should be accorded stability and predictability, the model
which would come closest to the ordinary courts is that of the
independent regulatory agency with open precedents. This will be
seen in the American jurisprudence to be the area where courts have
developed what is sometimes called a consistency requirement.
However, even in this regime consistency must be approached with
considerable caution. H. N. Janisch has argued that the CRTC
63
should articulate policy through the use of open precedents.
However, he cautions that respect for precedent should not lead to
consistency for its own sake. In a recent comment on a CRTC
decision he criticizes the Commission for following a consistent
policy and concludes that by doing so it has "painted itself into at
least three policy corners. '"64 When the leading scholar of a rare
Canadian tribunal which resembles the American independent
regulatory agency criticizes the Commission for being consistent,
notwithstanding his earlier eschewing of ad hoc decision-making, it
becomes apparent that the choice is not between consistency and
arbitrariness; it is between rational policy implementation with such
stability as the regime in question permits and an inflexible
straitjacket which pursues consistency for its own sake.
But the problem is not with the concept of consistency itself. So
long as a decision-maker considers the same factors in each case and
does so in good faith, the result will be consistent. The problem is
with popular, and especially lawyers', perceptions of what
considerations are relevant. The random action of a customs officer
is not inconsistent; random selection accords everyone an equal

62. See: C.W. Thomas and W.A. Finch, "Prosecutorial Decision Making"
(1976), 13 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 507.
63. Supra, note 38.
64. "The CRTC and Consistency: A Comment on the TCTS Decision" (1981),
C.R.R. 5-183, at 5-193.
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chance of being chosen. The same can be said of selective
prosecutions so long as criteria are objective and there is no personal
animus toward the accused. While a lottery might be an
objectionable mode of adjudication to those accustomed to a court
model, it may well be the most expeditious and least expensive
option open to an administrative decision-maker. It might also be
the most consistent.
IV. The American Law and the Problem of Comparative Judicial
Review
The inspiration for Professor Mullan's call for inconsistency review
is an American line of cases which are said to represent a "fairly
sophisticated jurisprudence. ' 65 Notwithstanding this admiring
characterization Mullan gives a three-point summary of the
American cases which suggests that he either places considerable
emphasis on the qualifier "fairly" or that he judges their
sophistication in terms of their capacity to raise questions as to the
reach of such a principle of judicial review.
It will be seen that these cases belong to two separate streams, a
major one amounting to a judicially imposed requirement that
agencies depart from a developed precedent only where a rational
explanation is provided, and a minor one based on the Equal
Protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S.
Constitution. It is my view that the former development is limited to
a handful of mainline court-substitute agencies and that the latter,
consisting of two District Court judgments, is wrong.
The first line of cases 66 has elements of imposing a precedential
model upon agencies but invariably the language of consistency is
tempered by a more modest requirement that the agency explain any
departures from its norms. Witness the following Per Curiam
excerpt from the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals: "This court
emphatically requires that administrative agencies adhere to their
own precedents or explain any deviations from them." ' 67 The
65. Supra, note 1, at 284.
66. These cases are reviewed in K.C. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise (2d ed.
San Diego: K.C. Davis Pub., 1979), v. 2 §§ 8.9-8.12 and 1982 Supplement §
1707. See also Davis, Administrative Law in the Seventies (Rochester: Lawyers'
Coop., 1976), § 17.07; and L. Jaffe, Judicial Control of Administrative Action
(Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1965), at 586-9.
67. Greyhound Corp. v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 551 F. 2d 414 at 416
(D.C. Cir. 1977). See also Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railroad Co. v.
WitchitaBoardof Trade, 412 U.S. 800 at 808 (1973).
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requirement of consistency is normally linked to an observation that
reviewing courts are not imposing a concept of stare decisis and that
agencies are free to develop policies in accordance with changed
circumstances or revised interpretations of relevant policy requirements. In American Trucking Association v. Atchison, Topeka and
Santa Fe Railway Co. Fortas J., giving the opinion of the Court,
dealt with needed flexibility which he said was an essential part of
the agencies' regulatory function:
Regulatory agencies do not establish rules of conduct to last
forever; they are supposed, within the limits of the law and of fair
and prudent administration, to adapt their rules and practices to
the Nation's needs in a volatile, changing economy. They are
neither required nor supposed to regulate the present and the
future within the inflexible limits of yesterday.6 8
The most likely construction of this line of jurisprudence is that it
admonishes agencies not to depart from established rules sub
silento. Of course the principle is extended when the court
undertakes a review of the agency's proffered reasons after a
remand. 69 However, such instances are exceptional and the typical
application involves a single remand where no explanation has been
given for an apparently inconsistent decision. In any event this type
of review does not extend very far across the administrative
spectrum. Professor Davis says that, depending on how you count,
it applies to anywhere from one per cent to ten per cent of
administrative decisions. 70 A review of the cases where the issue of
inconsistency arises reveals that the mainstream is constituted by a
68. 387 U.S. 397, at 415 (1967). See a 1980 decision of the Fourth Circuit Court
of Appeals where the Court holds that the NLRB has a duty to alter policies to
respond to new circumstances. J.P. Stevens Co. v. NLRB, 623 F.2d 322, at 329. In
FCC v. National Citizens' Committee for Broadcasting, 436 U.S. 775 (1978) the
Court noted the FCC's needed "ability to experiment" and commented: "One of
the most significant advantages of the circumstances in a flexible manner" (at
811).
69. See discussion at notes 29-35, supra.
70. Administrative Law Treatise, supra, note 66, v. 2, § 8.9, at 199. In this
context Professor Davis refers to the requirements of the AdministrativeProcedure
Act, 5 U.S.C. § 557(c), which stipulates that certain decisions follow a model of
formal adjudication, including the preparation of a record:
The record shall show the ruling on each finding, conclusion, or exception
presented. All decisions, including initial, recommended, and tentative
decisions, are a part of the record and shall include a statement of(A) findings and conclusions, and the reasons or basis therefor, on all the
material issues of fact, law, or discretion presented on the record; and (B) the
appropriate rule, order, sanction, relief, or denial thereof.
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handful of mainline, independent federal agencies which have
adopted an adjudicative model of policy-making. They each give
reasoned opinions which are publicly accessible and which are cited
as precedents in subsequent adjudications. 7 1 In fact, virtually all of
75
74
73
72
this jurisprudence involves the FCC, ICC, NLRB, FERC,
and the FPC. 76 It is rare that the principle has been invoked against
administrative decisions which do not fall into the court-like
policy-making-through-adjudication model.
The limitations of such a requirement can be seen in Sirbo
Holdings v. Commissionerof Internal Revenue 77 where a taxpayer
argued that he ought to be accorded the same treatment of a
purported capital gain as another similarly situated taxpayer. The
Commissioner simply admitted that the claimed precedent was in
error. Said Chief Judge Friendly:
While even-handed treatment should be the Commission's
goal ...

perfection in the administration of such vast respon-

However, this is not by any means a requirement which applies to all administrative
decisions, only to those "required by statute to be determined on the record after
opportunity for an agency hearing" (5 U.S.C. § 553 (c) and § 554(a)). The
infrequency of such a statutory stipulation underlies the comment by Professor
Davis that the practice of reasoned decision-making is so rare. Moreover it should
be noted that informal administrative action is not subject to any procedural
requirements under the APA and such action is subject only to the lowest standard
of judicial review, for "arbitrary and capricious" action (§ 706(2)(A)). And even
this review is excepted where "agency action is committed to agency discretion by
law." (§ 701(a)(2)).
71. Davis, id., at 196.
72. Federal Communications Commission: e.g. Columbia BroadcastingSystem,
Inc. v. FCC, 454 F.2d 1018 (D.C. Cir. 1971); GreaterBoston Television Corp. v.
FCC, 444 F.2d 841 (D.C. Cir. 1970); PublicInterest Research Group v. FCC, 522
F.2d 1060 (1st Cir. 1975).
73. Interstate Commerce Commission. See: Frozen Food Express v. United
States, 535 F.2d 877 (5th Cir. 1976); NeidartMotor Service v. United States, 583
F.2d 954 (7th Cir. 1978); ContractorsTransportCorp. v. United States, 537 F.2d
1160 (4th Cir. 1976).
74. National Labour Relations Board. See U.A.W. v. NLRB, 459 F.2d 1329 (D.C.
Cir. 1972); NLRB v. InternationalUnion of OperatingEngineers, Local 925, 460
F.2d 589 (5th Cir. 1972); NLRB v. Silver Bay Local Union, 498 F.2d (9th Cir.
1974).
75. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission. See: Hatch v. FERC, 654 F.2d 825
(D.C. Cir. 1981); Columbia Gas Transmission Corp. v. FERC, 628 F.2d 578
(D.C. Cir. 1979).
76. Federal Power Commission. See Districtof Massachusetts v. FPC, 517 F.2d
761 (1st Cir., 1975). FERC has taken over the functions of the former FAC,
Department of Energy OrganizationAct, P.L. 95-91, August 4, 1977, title IV. §
402; 42 U.S.C. § 7172 (1980 Supp.).
77. 509F.2d. 1220.
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sibilities cannot be expected

.

.

The making of an error in one

case, if error it was, gives other taxpayers no right to its
perpetuation. 78

The decision of the Second Circuit Court not to require consistency
of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue accords with the refusal of
courts to require consistent enforcement policy on the part of other
officials or prosecutors. 79 Neither have American courts been
prepared to review administratively imposed sanctions on the basis
of harsh or inconsistent application. In a case where a Circuit Court
questioned a decision for unevenness in the application of sanctions,
the Supreme Court overruled the lower court, saying that the setting
aside of the official's sanction was "an80 impermissible judicial
intrusion into the administrative domain."
It is clear that the American cases do not amount to a general
acceptance of a rule against administrative inconsistency. Instead
they might be said to be limited to a recognition of a need to police
incongruous decisions of agencies which choose to make policy by
adjudication and which have developed a precedential mode of
declaring their policies. The underlying rationale of these cases is a
concern for the reliance interest of affected parties and thus applies
only where an agency opts for rule-making through adjudication.
This explains the application of the principle to a handful of cases
78. Id., at 1222. Compare IBM Corp. v. U.S. 343 F.2d 914 (Ct. Claims, 1965).
This case involved a claim by IBM that a competitor Remington had, by virtue of a
ruling of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, not been subjected to a 10 per cent
excise tax on business machines from 1952 to 1958, at which time the
Commissioner revoked his earlier ruling. IBM had not received such a ruling and
claimed to have paid $13 million dollars in excise tax over the period for which
Remington was not similarly taxed. The majority of the Court of Claims held in
favour of IBM, concluding that "curbing tax collection in the interest of equality"
was required by a provision of the Internal Revenue Code respecting retroactivity
of regulations (at 919). Such a limitation was said to be implicit in the mandate
given by Congress and a failure to consider comparative effects on a question of
statutory interpretation the decision is a dubious one. If it is understood to rely on a
general principle of equality of treatment it is even more revolutionary. See the
dissenting opinion of Chief Judge Cowne and the cases cited therein. See also
Davis who said the decision is "unsound", Administrative Law of the Seventies,
supra, note 66 § 17.07-3. at 412. The Supreme Court denied certiorariin the IBM
case, 382 U.S. 1028 (1966).
79. Moog Industries v. FederalTrade Commission, 355 U.S. 411 (1958); U.S. v.
Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114 (1979). See J. Vorenberg, "Decent Restraint of
Prosecutorial Power" (1981), 94 Harvard L. Rev. 1521, esp. cases cited at n.7 1.
80. Butz v. Glover Livestock Commission, 411 U.S. 182, at 188-9 (1973). "The
fashioning of an appropriate and reasonable remedy is for the Secretary, not the
Court".
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and the refusal to apply it to "precedents" not intended to have a
normative character.
There exists a second line of cases, small in number but
potentially much more far-reaching in their impact, where the equal
protection guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S.
Constitution has been said to require consistent treatment, even in
making administrative decisions where precedents are not intended
to be norm-creating. The first such case and the most easily
explained is Yick Wo v. Hopkins,8 1 where a conviction under a
municipal ordinance requiring a license to operate a laundry in a
wooden building was set aside by the Supreme Court when it was
shown that licenses were denied to all two hundred Chinese
applicants but were granted to all but one of eighty non-Chinese.
The court found that the conclusion "could not be resisted" that the
ordinance was being applied in an inviduously discriminatory
fashion, i.e., on the basis of hostility to the race and nationality of
the appellant. In the opinion of the Court:
Though the law itself be fair on its face and impartial in
appearance, yet, if it is applied and administered by public
authority with an evil eye and an unequal hand, so as practically
to make unjust and illegal discriminations between persons in
similar circumstances, material to their rights, the denial82 of equal
justice is still within the prohibition of the Constitution.
The case has not subsequently been applied as a prohibition against
all unequal treatment, only "unjust and illegal discrimination." In
response to alleged prosecutorial abuses it has been interpreted as
applying only to invidious discrimination. 83
But there are instances in American case law where lower courts
have reviewed administrators' decisions on the basis of noninvidious discrimination. In Del Mundo v. Rosenberg8 4 the District
Director of the Immigration and Naturalization Service denied an
application for a stay of deportation. The District Court remanded
the matter to the Director because it was shown that a similarly
81. 118 U.S. 356(1886).
82. Id., at 373-4, per Matthews J.for the Court.
83. See cases cited in Vorenberg, supra, note 79, at n. 71. See also L. Tribe,
American Constitutional Law (Mineola, N.Y.: Foundation Press, 1978), at
1025-26. In UnitedStates v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 at 693 (1974) the Supreme Court
said: [T]he Executive Branch has exclusive authority and absolute discretion to
decide whether to prosecute a case". See Davis, Administrative Law Treatise,
supra, note 66, v.2, 9:1-9:22.
84. 341 F. Supp. 345 (C.D. Calif. 1972).
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situated applicant had been granted a stay. There was between the
two cases, according to Hauk District J., an "obvious identity"
which was "immediately apparent." 8 5 Such a denial of equal
protection of the laws was considered to be "arbitrary, capricious
and unreasonable" 8 6 and an abuse of discretion by the Director.
A second case where the equal protection clause was invoked is
Muhammad Ali v. Division of State Athletic Commission, New
York8 7 where the Commission suspended the plaintiff's boxing
license because of his refusal to submit to induction into the armed
forces. Ali produced evidence of 244 other cases where the
Commission had not suspended licenses notwithstanding conviction
of these license-holders for sometimes serious crimes, often
involving physical violence. The District Court Judge enjoined the
Commission from denying the licence. Ali, according to Mansfield
District J., had not been accorded "the even-handed administration
of the law which the Fourteenth Amendment requires." 8s8 He
concluded that the decision of the Commission "should and
constitutionally must have some rational basis.'"89
These cases do not however represent a general application of the
equal protection clause. They suffer from a misapprehension of the
function of the clause in believing that it is a general mandate to
review unreasonable or arbitrary acts. If that were so all official acts
in America, including sanctions, prosecutorial decisions and
administration of the revenue laws, would be subject to review if
treatment were shown to be uneven. We have already seen that the
Supreme Court declines to interfere with either sanctions or
prosecutions. What Ali and Del Mundo fail to perceive is that the
equal protection clause is aimed not at perfect consistency but at the
elimination of official discrimination. The precise point considered
in Muhammad Ali is contradicted by a passage from the judgment of
Chief Justice Stone, for the Court, in Snowden v. Hughes:
The unlawful administration by state officers of a state statute fair
on its face, resulting in its unequal application to those who are
entitled to be treated alike, is not a denial of equal protection

85. Id., at 348.
86. Id.
87. 316 F. Supp. 1246 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
88. Id., at 1250. Citing Yick Wo v. Hopkins as authority.
89. In Ali, Mansfield Dist. J. said the decision of the Commission "should and
constitutionally must have some rational basis", Id.
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unless there is shown to be present in it an element of intentional
or purposeful discrimination. 9 0
A question of arbitrary action cannot simply on the basis of
inequality be transformed into a constitutional issue and thereby
subjected to judicial review: "It is not without more denial of equal
protection of the laws." 9 1
Thus, if we set aside Ali and Del Mundo, we are left with a single
line of American cases involving federal agencies which, through
adjudication, develop policies which rise to normative status. The
constitutional principle is limited to the rare instance where uneven
application of the law violates constitutional guarantees against
invidious discrimination: i.e., irrational discrimination based on a
characteristic typical of membership in a class. That in summary is
what the "fairly sophisticated" American jurisprudence amounts
to. It does not exemplify any generally applicable judicial
requirement of consistency, equality or fairness. It is a tentative
effort to supervise a limited number of court-like official
decision-makers.
Quite apart from the question of whether the American cases do
in fact represent the principle stated, there remains a more
fundamental problem. Selective reliance upon isolated elements of
administrative supervision from other jurisdictions is a dangerous
undertaking. Judicial review of administrative action is politically
90. 321 U.S. 1 at 8 (1943). That "discrimination", as it is used by Chief Justice
Stone, refers to some characteristic of the plaintiff and not merely to unequal
treatment per se is emphasized by the dissenting judgment of Douglas J. who
differed from the majority only in his preference for giving the plaintiff an
opportunity to show discrimination:
If the action of the Illinois Board in effect were the same as an Illinois law that
Snowden could not run for office, it would run afoul of the equal protection
clause whether that discrimination were based on the fact Snowden was a
Negro, Catholic, Presbyterian, Free Mason, or had some other characteristicor
belief which the authorities did not like. Snowden should be allowed the
opportunity to make that showing no matter how thin his chances of success
may seem. (at 19).
91. Id., at 8. See also: Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483 (1955): "The
prohibition of the Equal Protection clause goes no further than the invidious
discrimination" (at 489); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1961): "It is not inequality
alone that calls for a holding of unconstitutionality; only if that inequality is based
on an impermissible standard may this Court condemn it." (at 335) per Harlan J.
dissenting; City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297 (1975): "[I]n the local
economics sphere, it is only the invidious discrimination, the wholly arbitrary act,
which cannot stand consistently with the Fourteenth Amendment." (at 303-4). Per
Curiam Opinion); Beck v. Washington, 369 U.S. 541 at 554 (1961). Also: N.
Dorsen, Frontiersof Civil Liberties (New York: Pantheon), at 291-92.
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sensitive. It is the product of a political, socio-economic and
constitutional dynamic. The resulting equilibrium is a sensitive one.
In the end the balance between judicial overseeing and administrative autonomy may simply be a matter of emphasis or attitude. In
any event principles of judicial review cannot be glibly and
selectively borrowed from one milieu and successfully applied in
another unless the comparative process is complete.
A comparison of several significant elements of the Canadian and
American models of judicial review will sound a note of caution
against selective borrowing of American principles involving more
extensive review. There are significant disparities between the two
systems, with the Canadian model being clearly more deferential to
administrative decision-makers. The disparate emphases of the two
systems can be illustrated by reference to three black-letter themes
as well as by an overview of scholarly attitudes.
The first such divergence between Canadian and American
developments is in the review of errors of law. Canadian
jurisprudence has recently evinced a decidedly deferential attitude
toward administrative interpretations of law. This has not always
been the case as the traditional position was to review any error of
law on the face of the record 92 unless the decision-maker was
protected by a "no certiorari" privative clause. 93 Recent cases,
following the example of the judgment of Dickson J. in Canadian
Union of Public Employees, Local 963 v. New Brunswick Liquor
Corp.,9 4 have typically deferred to administrative interpretations
which are not "patently unreasonable," even in the absence of
privative provisions. 95 There is in this development an apparent
92. R. v. Northumberland Compensation Appeal Tribunal Exp. Shaw, [1952] 1

K.B. 338; Industrial Relations Board of Alberta v. Stedelbauer Chevrolet
Oldsmobile, [1969] S.C.R. 137; Yellow Cab Ltd. v. Alberta IndustrialRelations

Board, [1980] 2 S.C.R. 761.
93. Farrell v. Workmen's Compensation Board of British Columbia, [1962]
S.C.R. 48.
94. [197912 S.C.R. 227.
95. Alberta Union of ProvincialEmployees, Branch 63 v. Alberta Public Service
Employee Relations Board and Board of Governors of Olds College (1982), 37
A.R. 28 1 at 286 and 289 (S.C.C.); Lafrance and Commission des Affaires Sociales
v. St. Luc Hospital (1982), 42 N.R. 434 (S.C.C.). Both Lafrance and Olds College
dealt with "near" privative provisions. In Ontario since 1962 the courts have
deferred to statutory arbitrations which have no express privative clause: Re
Canadian Westinghouse Co. Ltd. and Local 164 Draftsmen's Association of
Ontario, [ 1962] O.R. 17 (C.A.). See the development of a similar pattern in review
of consensual labour arbitrations: Volvo CanadaLtd. v. U.A.W. Local 720, [1980]
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sensitivity of the need to delineate respective fields of expertise for
courts and agencies, hence the emergence of an exception to the
policy of "curial deference" where general statutory considerations
are at play.98
As Professor R.A. MacDonald has observed, the touchstone of
error in law review is the attitude of judges. 97 In Canada attitudes
have been for the most part deferential. In United States the case
law is more equivocal. A recent Supreme Court opinion evinces a
deferential approach to agency interpretations where the problem is
one of an "interstitial silence" and where the interpretation is not
"demonstrably irrational. '"98 Where however the problem is not
caused by legislative silence but arises simply as a matter of
interpretation, such as in determining whether to treat back pay as
wages it is said: "An agency may not finally decide the limits of its
statutory power. That is a judicial function. " 99 There are frequent
recent examples where the Supreme Court has undertaken review of
administrative interpretations without any mention of deferring to
1 S.C.R. 178; and Shalansky and Saskatchewan Union of Nurses v. Regina Pasqua
Hospital(1983), 47 N.R. 76 (S.C.C.).
It should be noted that there have been legislative developments in Canada which
on their face run counter to this judicial policy of deference to administrative
interpretations of law. For example the Ontario JudicialReview ProcedureAct,
R.S.O. 1980, c. 224, s.2(2) provides for review for error of law to the extent not
limited by the organic statute but this may not have significantly altered Common
Law developments. For instance the deferential policy toward statutory arbitrators
begun in Westinghouse has continued and has received the approbation of the
Supreme Court of Canada: Bradburn et al. v. Wentworth Arms Motel, [1979] 1
S.C.R. 846; MacLeod v. Egan, [1975] 1 S.C.R. 517.
More directly contrary is the review provision of the FederalCourt Act, S.C.
1970-71-72, c. 1, s. 28(1)(b). While the point cannot be adequately considered in a
footnote, the full force of this latter provision has been muted by policies of judicial
deference. See e.g. MapleLodge FarmsLtd. v. Minister of EconomicDevelopment
(1982), 44 N.R. 354 at 359-60 (S.C.C.); HalifaxLongshoremen's Association v.
Nauss et al. (1983), 46 N.R. 324 at 333-6 (S.C.C.).
96. Olds College, id., at 289;MacLeod v. Egan, id., 517 at 518-19.
97. "Annual Survey of Administrative Law' (1981), 13 Ottawa L.R. 671, at 708.
98. Ford MotorCreditCo. v. Milhollin, 444 U.S. 555 at 565 (1980).
99. Social Security Board v. Swift and Co., the Supreme Court said the agency
interpretation constituted "a body of experience and informed judgment to which
courts and litigants may properly resort for guidance." 323 U.S. 134 at 140
(1944). Emphasis added.
100. Industrial UnionDept., AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Instituteet al., 448
U.S. 607 (1980); Environmental Protection Agency v. National Crushed Stone
Association et al., 449 U.S. 64 (1980); Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v.
Marathon Pipeline Co. et al., 102 S.Ct. 2858 (1982); North Haven Board of
Education v. Bell; 102 S.Ct. 1912 (1982).
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expert judgment. 10 0 Another variation is the case of Gray v. Powell
which limited the scope of judicial review to ensuring that there has
been "an application of the statute in a just and reasoned
0
manner."1 1
Whatever emerges as the dominant view from the American case
law, it seems that Congress may be about to reassert what Professor
Davis calls "the extravagant version of the rule of law."' 10 2 On
March 24, 1982 the Senate adopted by a vote of 94-0 a Regulatory
Reform Act including an amendment to the Administrative
Procedure Act expanding the scope of judicial review so that a
reviewing court "shall independently decide all relevant questions
of law.' 103 The statement of legislative intent which was printed in
the Congressional Record along with the amendment clarifies the
impact of the change:
While permitting a court to consider the agency interpretation,
this amendment does not permit a court to presume that the
interpretation of the agency is correct simply because it is the
interpretation of the agency. The interpretation of the agency
should be afforded "weight" by the reviewing court only
because of its 0persuasiveness,
not because of the source of the
4

interpretation. '

Whatever "weight" American courts incline to place upon
administrative interpretations of law under the new regime, it is
101. 314U.S. 402at411 (1941).
102. AdministrativeLaw Treatise, supra, note 66, §2:11.
103. S. 1080, 97th Cong., 2nd Sess., Congressional Record, Vol. 128, no. 31,
S2717-18.
The initiative in the Second Session of the 97th Congress was not completed as the
House of Representatives did not bring a counterpart to S. 1080 to the floor during
the lame-duck session following the 1982 Congressional elections. The House bill
(H.R. 746) was said to have "a great deal of support" but was pre-empted by
budget debates. (See CongressionalRecord, Vol. 128, no. 134, H8388).
104. 97th Cong., 2nd Sess., Congressional Record, No. 28. S2406, March 18,
1982. For an indication of the reactionary opinion and the theoretical ambiguity of
the legislation see a comment by Senator Paul Laxalt, one of two main sponsors in
the Senate: "This amendment makes abundant sense. It has long been the view of
many that judicial review of regulatory action has been sadly deficient, not only in
terms of its ineffectiveness, but also in terms of affording any judge who is so
disposed of a way out from performing his proper duty and responsibility." (td.)
For commentary on the proposed amendment, see: D.R. Woodward and R.M.
Levin, "In Defence of Deference: Judicial Review of Agency Action" (1979), 31
Ad. Law Rev. 329; O'Reilly, "Deference Makes a Difference: A Study of Impacts
of the Bumpers Judicial Review Amendment" (1980), 49 U. of Cinn. Law Rev.
739. For an earlier view on the question generally, see: L. Jaffe, "Judicial Review
of Questions of Law" (1955), 69 Harv. L. Rev. 239.
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clear that the standard deviates appreciably from the "patently
unreasonable" test which prevails in Canada.
Another area where Canadian and American principles diverge is
evidentiary review. Canadian courts will not review the weight,
value or sufficiency of evidence. 10 5 There is even some doubt
whether a reviewing court will look into the record to see if there
was any evidence at all to aupport a factual finding.10 6 However, the
most likely view of the Canadian position is that there must be at
least some evidence and that a complete absence thereof would
10 7
amount to an abuse of discretion or a failure of jurisdiction.
American law, by contrast, requires that there be substantial
evidence on the record as a whole.108 The Supreme Court
distinguished this standard from what some courts had considered to
be a requirement that there be only "some" evidence by saying that
courts "must now assume more responsibility for the reasonableness and fairness" 10 9 of decisions. The evidentiary standard of the
Administrative ProcedureAct was interpreted by the Supreme Court
to impose on courts a responsibility for assuring that the agency
"keeps within reasonable grounds."110
A further example of the divergent approaches to judicial review
can be drawn from the respective constitutional limitations on
legislative delegation to agencies."' In a recent decision the
Supreme Court of Canada considered a broad delegation to the Law
105. R. Reid and H. David, Administrative Law and Practice 2d ed. (Toronto:
Butterworths, 1978), at 357.
106. D.W. Elliot, "No Evidence: A Ground for Judicial Review In Canadian
Administrative Law?" (1972), 37 Sask L. Rev. 48; Reid and David, Ibid at 357-8,
n. 97-99. Cf. H.W.R. Wade, Administrative Law (5th ed., Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1982), at 287, for the view that "no-evidence" means more than a total
dearth of evidence; it extends to any case where the evidence, taken as a whole, is
not reasonably capable of supporting a finding.
107. Reid and David, id., at 359-60. Mullan, supra, note 10, at 3-159. See also
R.L. Towner, "No Evidence and Excess of Jurisdiction in Administrative Law",
[1978] N.Z.L.J. 48.
108. AdministrativeProcedureAct, 5 U.S.C. §706(2) E (1976). This requirement
applies to formal rulemakings and adjudications, not to informal proceedings.
109. Universal Camera Corp.v. NationalLabour Relations Board, 340 U.S. 474
at 490 (1951).
110. Id.On remand the 2d Circuit Court of Appeals reversed its earlier judgment
in which it had deferred to the NLRB. NLRB v. Universal Camera Corp. (II), 190
F.2d 429 (2d Cir. 1951).
111. The separation of powers is not a constitutional limitation on delegation by
legislatures which follow the British parliamentary model. Even the Report of the
Committee on Ministers' Powers. cmnd. 4060 (1932), which embraced the
doctrine as being primafacie the guiding principle for delegated legislation (at 92)
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Society of British Columbia to discipline "conduct unbecoming a
member of the society. 11 2 Estey J., speaking for a unanimous
Court, found "nothing in law pathological" 113 about the agency
being drawn from the sector which was to be regulated. After
pointing out some advantages as well as possible conflicts arising
from such self-regulation, Estey J. said:
It is for the legislature to weigh and determine all these matters
and I see no constitutional consequences necessarily flowing
from the regulatory mode adopted by the province in legislation
validly enacted within its sovereign sphere; as is the case here. 114
A similar point was made by the Privy Council in 1938 when it
rejected an argument that a provincial legislature was incapable of
delegating certain powers to the Lieutenant-Governor in council.
The Privy Council was of the view that any such limitation would be
"subversive" of the supremacy of the legislature. 115
In America the non-delegation doctrine, founded in the
separation of powers and a contractarian theory of government, has
been invoked to strike down legislative delegations of power. In
ultimately had to concede: "The separation of powers is merely a rule of political
wisdom, and must give way where sound reasons of public policy so require" (at
95).
A more contemporary view is that of H.W.R. Wade, who comments:
Administrative legislation is traditionally looked upon as a necessary evil, an
unfortunate but inevitable infringement of the separation of powers. But this is
an old-fashioned view, for in reality it is no more difficult to justify it in theory
than it is possible to do without it in practice. There is only a hazy borderline
between legislation and administration, and the assumption that they are two
fundamentally different forms of power is misleading.
(supra, note 106, at 733). Also: M.J.C. Vile, Constitution and the Separationof
Powers (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1967), at 212-38.
112. Attorney-General of Canada v. Law Society of British Columbia, [1982] 5
W.W.R. 289. The legislation in question is the Legal ProfessionsAct, R.S.B.C.
1960, c. 214, s. 48(b)(iii).
113. Id., at 313.
114. Id.
115. Shannon v. Lower MainlandDairyProductsBoard, [1938]A.C. 708 at 722.
See Hogg, ConstitutionalLawof Canada (Toronto: Carswell, 1977) at 213-17. See
also: Hodge v. The Queen (1883), 9 App. Cas. 117; Shannon v. MainlandDairy
Products Board, [1938] A.C. 708 at 713; and John Willis "Delegatus Non Potest
Delegare" (1943), 21 Can. Bar Rev. 257.
In a comprehensive article entitled "The Historic Bases of Administrative Law:
Separation of Powers and Judicial Supremacy" (1958), 12 Lut. L. Rev. 449, R.
Parker comments: "Prior to the American and French Revolutions, separation
never existed as a part of any constitutional system of a national government" (at
481).
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Schecter Poultry v. United States a system of industrial regulation
through the adoption of codes of fair competition was struck down
as being an unconstitutional delegation of power. The discretion
vested in the President was characterized as being "virtually
unfettered" 116 and subject to no standards. A concurring opinion of
Cardozo J. termed the scheme "delegation running riot." ' 1 17 The
non-delegation doctrine has survived in mostly dormant fashion
since the Schecter decision but there are current signs of a revival,
and not surprisingly many of those advocating its renaissance are
the same commentators who are concerned about unchecked
discretion. 118 The coincidence is not surprising because claims for
structured exercises of discretion and arguments about unconstitutionally broad delegations of power are ultimately motivated by
similar concerns regarding the problem of administrative discretion.
The doctrine has also been raised in recent Supreme Court
decisions, although not as the basis of a majority opinion. 1 9
Whatever may be the future of the non-delegation doctrine' 2 0 the
point remains that because of a fundamentally different perception
of the relationship between the legislative and executive branches of
government, American courts approach judicial review from an
orientation which is radically different from that of Canadian
judges. 12 ' This is an orientation which in turn pervades more
116. 255 U.S. 495 at 542 (1935). Also PanamaRefining Co. V. Ryan, 293 U.S.
388 (1935).
117. Id., at 553.
118. J. Ely, Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of JudicialReview (Cambridge:
Harvard Press, 1980), at 131-4; Skelly Wright, supra, note 39, at 582-7; J.
Freedman, Crisis and Legitimacy, The Administrative Process and American
Government (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1978), at 78-94; T. Lowi, The
End of Liberalism (New York: Norton, 1969), at 129-46.
119. Industrial Union Department, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Institute,
448 U.S. 607 at 672-76 (1980). Concurring opinion of Rehnquist J. American
Textile Manufacturers Institute v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490 at 548 (1981).
Rehnquist J. dissenting (concurred in by Burger C.J.). See National Cable
Television Association V. United States, 415 U.S. 336 (1974) where the
non-delegation doctrine was said to require a narrow construction of the statute.
Also the opinion of Stephens J. in American Petroleum Institute, supra.
120. See "Rethinking the Nondelegation Doctrine" (1982), 62 Bos. U.L. Rev.
257; Garvey, "Judicial Consideration of the Delegation of Legislative Power to
Regulatory Agencies in the Progressive Era" (1978), 54 Ind. L.J. 45; P. Gewirtz,
"The Courts, Congress, and Executive Policy-Making: Notes on Three Doctrines"
(Summer, 1976), 40 Law and Contemporary Problems 46, at 52; S. Barber, The
Constitution and the Delegation of Congressional Power (Chicago: Univ. of
Chicago Press, 1975).
121. One can appreciate the diversity of the two approaches as illustrated in a
passage from Martin Shapiro, an American administrative and constitutional
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specific aspects of judicial review and which influences the views of
scholars and politicians. Therefore the extent to which the
separation of powers doctrine has infected American judicial review
is an element which must be cautiously weighed when proposing the
importation of an American principle of review for inconsistency
into the Canadian context.
Another important area, both as a barometer of general
satisfaction and as a precursor of developing trends, where
Canadian and American conditions diverge is in the tenor of
scholarly criticism. American scholars tend to be in almost
universal agreement on the need to check discretionary power and in
a faith in judicial review as a means of confining it. In the vanguard
is Professor Davis whose 1969 book 122 was greeted by Skelly
Wright as a "powerful manifesto"' 12 3 which "brilliantly and
systematically laid bare the soft underbelly of the American legal
system."'12 4 At that time, 1971, Judge Wright was of the view that
"a broad consensus is beginning to coalesce in favour of doing
2 5
something about unbridled and arbitrary administrative power.'1
Richard B. Stewart, in a comprehensive 1975 article, commented
on his own suggestion that there be a return to faith in the expertise
and specialized experience of administrators by saying: "[Blut this
is the very faith of which we have become disabused."1 2 6 Professor
Schwartz, looking ahead to the next century, predicts a broadening
of judicial review to the extent that it will become effectively
appellate review. He bases his forecast upon a "growing
disenchantment with the administrative process" but says the
"pervasive mistrust" of government does not extend to reviewing

scholar who had this reaction to British ministerial delegations: Courts (Chicago:
Univ. of Chicago Press, 1981), at 123-4:
The process of both parliamentary and judicial abdication has gone so far that
there are serious doubts whether the rule of law survives in England at all. And
if it does, it must do so in the ideological commitments of the executive elite
itself rather than in the constraining powers of the courts.
See also: B. Schwartz, Law and the Executive in Britain (New York: New York
Univ. Press, 1949), at 30.
122: DiscretionaryJustice, supra, note 39.
123. Book Review, supra, note 39, at 577.
124. Id.
125. Id., at 597.
126. Supra, note28, at 1711.
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courts.12 7 One could refer to other American writers128 but the point
becomes redundant. In order to find wholehearted proponents of
judicial deference and administrative discretion, it is necessary to
look back to Jerome Frank' 2 9 and James M. Landis,' 30 both of
whom were original participants in the New Deal.' 3 '
In Canada, by contrast, the trend has been decidedly to the
opposite effect. There is no malaise comparable to that found in
American writings. Harry Arthurs has recently called for judges to
give "full recognition to the distinctive legal systems which have
emerged" and to acknowledge "the reality of pluralism."' 132 The
127. "Administrative Law in the Next Century" (1978), 39 Ohio S.L.J. 805, at
829.
128. Abraham D. Sofaer, "Judicial Control of Informal Discretionary Adjudication and Enforcement" (1972), 72 Col. L.R. 1293; J. Freedman "Crisis and
Legitimacy in the Administrative Process" (1975), 27 Stan. L. Rev. 1041;
McGowan, "Congress, Court and Control of Delegated Power" (1977), 77 Col. L.
Rev. 1199. Two of the more strident denunciations of the administrative process
and F.
can be found in T. Lowi, The End of Liberalism, supra, note 118, at 287 ff;
Hayek, The Constitutionof Liberty (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1960). More
tolerant views can be seen in H. Friendly, The Federal Administrative Agencies
(Cambridge: Harvard Press, 1962) (while Judge Friendly advocates the
development of more definite standards, he rejects recourse to judicial review as a
response (at 141 ff.)); and H. Saferstein. "Nonreviewability: A Functional
Analysis of 'Committed to Agency Discretion' (1968), 82 Harv. L. Rev. 367.
129. Supra, note 60.
130. The Administrative Process (New Haven: Yale Press, 1938). There are two
examples of contemporary American scholarship which, while not embracing the
New Deal model of broad discretion and limited judicial review, contend for a
move away from the delays and uncertainties which accompany "formal review."
Curiously one advocate is Richard Stewart who, while not renouncing his 1975
views regarding the "problem of agency discretion" (supra, note 28), argues for
an informal process of negotiation in search of consensus which, if successful,
would be accorded a much more deferential standard of judicial review:
"Regulation, Innovation, and Administrative Law: A Conceptual Framework"
(1981), 69 Calif. L. Rev. 1259, at 1271, 1276-7, and 1348. A second example of
concern with "the price of undue formalism" can be found in Bruce A. Ackerman
and William T. Hassler, Clean Coal/DirtyAir (New Haven: Yale Press, 1981), at
113-14. This model would abandon judicial grasping at "procedural straws",
preferring that courts intervene "through substantive construction" of the statute
(emphasis that of the authors) to assure a full and focused airing of plausible policy
options.
131. Landis was chairman of the SEC from 1935-37. He also served on the FTC
and later on the CAB. Frank was chairman of the SEC from 1939-41 and acted as
general counsel to other agencies.
132. "Rethinking Administrative Law: A Slightly Dicey Business" (1979), 17
'Osgoode Hall L.J. 1, at 45. See also Arthurs, "Jonah and the Whale: The
Appearance, Disappearance, and Reappearance of Administrative Law" (1980),
30 U. of T. L.J. 225; and "Recognizing Administrative Law" in Proceedings of
the AdministrativeLaw Conference (Vancouver: U.B.C. Law Review, 1981), at 2.
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Mullan article, so far from being the "powerful manifesto" of
Professor Davis whose ideas it adopts, is very much a model of
conservatism. The authority of the courts over the administrative
process is said to be "desirably a reserve one," subject to restraint
which is claimed to be justified by "respect for legislative
preference"' 3 3 and an appreciation of the respective expertise of
courts and administrative tribunals. Professor Angus argued in 1974
for a narrowing of judicial review,"' 3 4 joining in Professor Hogg's
view that "there is nothing intrinsically good about judicial
review.' ' 35 John Willis, writing a 1968 commentary which is
highly critical of the "ideological" theme of the McRuer Report,
characterized judicial review as having a "merely peripheral" role
in the administrative process. 136 In a 1975 paper, Steve Wexler,
advocating acknowledgement of "responsible personal authority"
as a source of law, observed: "Discretion and institutions built on it
are the norm in law and we must teach lawyers to understand
them.' ' 37 These views evidence more than the opinion of the
individual writers; they represent a distinct view of the administra133. Supra, note 1, at 275. Emphasis added.
134. W.H. Angus, "The Individual and the Bureaucracy: Judicial Review Do We
Need It?" (1974), 20 McGill L.J. 177.
135. P.G. Hogg, "Judicial Review: How Much Do We Need?" (1974), 20
McGill L.J. 157, at 158. See also A. Abel "Appeals Against Administrative
Decisions" (1962), 5 Can. Pub. Admin. 65. For an early view that "the judges of
the ordinary courts know nothing of the problems of administration," see John
Willis, "Three Approaches to Administrative Law: The Judicial, The Conceptual,
and the Functional" (1935), 1U. of T.L.J. 53, at 80.
I find two examples in Canadian writings which advocate substantive judicial
review of administrative decisions. The first is the McRuer Report which, clearly
under the inspiration of American developments, recommends extended powers for
the courts to review errors of law on the face of the record (Royal Commission
Inquiry Into Civil Rights (1968), Chapt. 19). The second, and more radical, is a
recent Comment by Julius Grey arguing that "substantive fairness" is "an
essential component of the new orthodoxy"; "Can Fairness Be Effective?"
(1982), 27 McGill L.J. 360, at 370. See also Grey, "The Ideology of
Administrative Law" (1983), 13 Man. L.J. 35.
Reference might also be made to a Comment by Noel Lyon in which he proposes
an abandonment of jurisdictional concepts in favour of a general "without
authority" standard. This proposal would, on questions of law, retreat from the
emerging curial deference described above. "Administrative Law - Continuing
Search for A General Theory of Judicial Review of Administrative Actions for
Legality" (1980), 58 Can. Bar Rev. 646.
136. "The McRuer Report: Lawyers' Values and Civil Servants' Values" (1968),
18 U. of T.L.J. 351, at 352.
137. "Discretion": The Unacknowledged Side of Law" (1975), 25 U. of T.L.J.
120, at 175. See also: Wexler, "Non-Judicial Decision-Making" (1975), 13
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tive process which bears little resemblance to the American
actuality. That they dovetail as neatly as they do with what is clearly
a prevailing philosophy of judicial deference in the Supreme Court
of Canada is not coincidental. Taken together they form an unlikely
backdrop for the introduction into Canadian judicial review of an
American principle developed in an atmosphere which can only be
said to be hostile to administrative discretion.
Thus a comparison of American and Canadian judicial review
reveals an underlying divergence of philosophies regarding the
respective roles of courts and agencies. Prevailing scholarly
opinions are opposed. Canadian courts are clearly more deferential
to the substance of agency decisions, as manifested by their
restrained approach to reviewing errors of law or sufficiency of
evidence, and the Canadian philosophical orientation is not infected
by a constitutionally mandated separation of powers. Finally, the
American jurisprudence has emerged without any resistance from
concepts like our Canadian prohibition against fettering
discretion. 13 8 The point of demonstrating these disparities is not to
advocate insularity in the development of Canadian judicial review.
There is great utility in comparative analysis. But the utility of such
analysis must lie as much in what it teaches us about our own
system as in what we learn about others. And its success depends
upon a full inquiry into related principles and themes in both
systems. Above all the trap of selective importation of principles
developed in other contexts must be avoided.
Osgoode Hall L.J. 839. For a response to Davis' DiscretionaryJustice, see H.T.
Wilson, "'Discretion' In the Analysis of the Administrative Process" (1972), 10
Osgoode Hall L.J. 117.
138. The issue of the competence of agencies to narrow their discretion through
self-created policy has not been much discussed in American cases. One instance
where it was raised provoked this response from Judge Friendly for the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals:
We are unable to understand why there should be any general principle
forbidding an administrator, vested with discretionary power, to determine by
appropriate rulemaking that he will not use it in favor of a particular class on a
case-by-case basis, if his determination is founded on considerations rationally
related to the statute he is administering. The legislature's grant of discretion to
accord a privilege does not imply a mandate that this must inevitably be done by
examining each case rather than by identifying groups.
435 f.2d 728, at 730. CF: Asimakopoulas v. Immigration and Naturalization
Service, 445 F.2d 1362 (9th Cir. 1971). And see commentary of Professor Davis in
his Treatise, supra, note 66, at 195-96, where Davis says Asimakopoulas is a rare
decision.
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V. Conclusion
The central problem in this discussion has been to determine to what
extent, if any, we can call upon supervisory courts to control
administrative actions which we believe to be inconsistent.
Underlying that question is the difficult problem of defining
"consistency". My approach to this latter problem is that you
cannot define consistency, you can only argue about it. Thus the
references to inconsistency in this paper have been coupled with
qualifiers like "claimed", "alleged" or "ostensible". If a
designated decision-maker considers a matter in good faith and
considers the same factors which he would in other cases, it cannot
be objectively shown that the decision is inconsistent with claimed
precedents. We can attempt to persuade the decision-maker that the
substantive outcome should be different but in the end we must
concede that the decision is his or hers to make. In the end, this
discussion, like so many problems raised by judicial review, comes
down to a question of deference to preferred decision-makers. The
problem of inconsistency does not admit of any middle ground.
Either the courts or the administrative decision-maker must choose
and prevail. For my part I believe the only viable option is to
continue to defer to administrators.
The answer, therefore, to the question of how much control
courts should exercise over what is asserted to be inconsistent action
is "no more than is consistent with existing deferential standards of
judicial review." Unless a claimed instance of uneven treatment can
be dealt with as a jurisdictional problem, courts ought not to
intervene. I take the basic position, which I understand to be in
accord with Professor Mullan, that supervisory courts should refrain
from interfering in the substance of administrative decisions.
Review of inconsistency involves no such supervisory neutrality.
When a court enters into a review of the proffered justification of
the agency for what is an apparent inconsistency, it descends from
its removed role of independent surveillance to undertake a fresh
appraisal of the merits of the decision. Such an incursion subverts
the very purpose of the legislature in selecting the tribunal in
question and involves courts in an enterprise which can only
undermine their integrity and hopelessly tax their resources.
But adherence to a traditional model of deferential judicial review
need not imply that nothing at all can be done in cases where a
convincing argument can be made that a decision-maker has acted
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inconsistently. Short of a general review for inconsistency there
may be a role for courts to address in part the problem raised by
claimed unequal treatment. At least one alternative can be identified
whereby it would be possible for courts to retain their neutral role
yet still guarantee that officials be deliberate about departures from
prior norms. Without resorting to a novel basis of judicial review
such as inconsistency, the infirmity of unexplained departures from
prior norms could be treated as prima facie evidence that the
decision-maker has failed to properly consider the matter in
question. Thereby courts can ensure that agencies be deliberate if
they intend to persist with what is arguably an inconsistent choice.
Although the language of "failure to genuinely consider the matter
in question" is not instantly recognizable as a category of
reviewable error, it is this concept which underlies the more familiar
categories of fettering discretion, acting under dictation, unlawful
sub-delegation, acting for an improper purpose, and ultimately,
bias.
The quashing of a decision for an apparent failure to consider the
matter need not be seen as tantamount to a requirement that the
decision-maker give reasons. However, it would at least imply an
obligation to indicate that all relevant circumstances have been
included in the calculus. It may be that in the end a reasoned
explanation will be necessary to satisfy a reviewing court of the
good faith of the agency. This point regarding reasoned decisions
raises a fresh issue which is related to the problem of inconsistency
but which must be left for another time. A requirement of reasoned
decision-making, either by statute or by common law, 13 9 raises new
prospects for development of administrative norms through
precedent and, consequently, for more frequent claims of
inconsistent treatment. In much the same manner as a review for
inconsistency it raises the problem of judicial deference if parties
challenge the sufficiency of stated reasons.
139. Reasons for decision are now required by some statutory regimes. E.g.
Administrative Procedures Act, R.S.A. 1970, c.2, s.8; Statutory Powers
ProcedureAct, R.S.O. 1980, c.484, s. 17. The traditional view is that reasons for
decision are not required by common law principles: See MacDonald v. The
Queen, [1977] 2 S.C.R. 665; Re Stoangi and Law Society of Upper Canada
(1979), 25 O.R. (2d) 257 (Ont. Div. Ct.); Mullan, AdministrativeLaw, supra, note
10, at 3-117. But cf. Yarmouth Housing Ltd. v. Rent Review Commission (1982),
54 N.S.R. (2d) 28 (S.C.A.D.); R.D.R. Construction Ltd. v. Rent Review
Commission (1982), 55 N.S.R. (2d) 71 (S.C.A.D.). See case comment by A.
Wayne MacKay, supra, note 54.
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There is another potential avenue by which courts can effectively
and appropriately review what are claimed to be inconsistent
decisions. It is arguable that there is a need for supervisory courts to
perform a system-coordinating function in reviewing administrative
interpretations of law. Such a need can be seen in instances where
coordinate decision-makers interpret legislative provisions in
apparently inconsistent fashions but where neither interpretation
prevails. Usual standards of judicial deference to administrative
interpretations of law would insulate both views from review,
unless one of them were patently unreasonable. In this case courts
can serve a useful coordinating function, not based on such
theoretical underpinnings as review for inconsistency but as an
exception to prevailing standards of curial deference. In a sense this
is the situation which faced the English Court of Appeal in
Pearlman v. Keepers and Governors of Harrow School. 140 Such
review can be achieved by styling a second exception to the current
policy of curial deference to administrative interpretations of law,
but need not go so far as the approach adopted by the Court of
Appeal in Pearlman.
To favour a limited role for supervisory courts is not necessarily
to condone inconsistent treatment or to acquiesce in it. There may
be other more appropriate instruments by which to influence the
agency. Where there is a consensus opposed to the decision-maker
but where he acts within jurisdiction, the problem is not one of
legality to be supervised by reviewing courts but one of policy to be
resolved in other ways. In the end it may be a matter of
incompetence on the part of the decision-maker. Or it may be that
his or her view of the proper policy to follow or of the appropriate
values to weigh, though reasonable, is not the best one. When an
agency acts within its jurisdiction in good faith but in an arguably
inconsistent manner, the appropriate response is to exert political
pressure. This will normally come from affected parties and interest
groups and, one hopes, from the media and academics. Such
political pressure may make an impression on the agency itself or on
the legislature. If it is said that affected parties, the media,
140. [1979] 1 All E.R. 365. For a judicial expression of opinion which may
amount to such a call for a system-coordinating exception to general standards of
judicial deference, see the concurring judgment of Moir J.A. in United Nurses of
Alberta, Local 11, and Thomas v. Misericordia Hospital, [1983] 6 W.W.R. I
(Alta. C.A.).
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academics and legislative overseers are too busy to effectively
prevail over the vast apparatus of bureaucracy, that same argument
is all the more compelling against claims that courts should
undertake the task. More importantly, this political constituency
will be sensitive to interests which are typically beyond the range of
considerations entertained by courts. The dynamic nature of the
political process is better suited to resolving such issues than is the
comparatively hermetic process of a reviewing court.
In the end the answer is to strive for an administrative apparatus
which will guarantee the greatest degree of rationality. The matter is
above all one of institutional design and of the competence of
agency personnel. If there is no apparent consistency on the front
lines, supervisory courts can sit around the clock only to exacerbate
the problem. For my part I take no such grim view of the
administrative process. The existing relationship between reviewing
courts and administrative agencies is characterized by an admirably
consistent attitude of curial deference. To now adopt a radically less
deferential attitude would itself be inconsistent and would be an
unjustified departure from past practice.
Professor Mullan says in conclusion that the debate over the
frontiers of judicial review is really about the use of words.
Sometimes I wonder if we can trust ourselves to consider such a
delicately balanced equilibrium as exists between judicial oversight and curial deference only in terms of words. While language
is a tool of lawyers and judges it can very subtly become our master.
Certain words like consistency and fairness, or phrases like "treat
like cases alike," evoke peculiar rhetorical connotations which are
superficially alluring but which may, if incautiously followed,
prove to be the lyrics of a siren song. To now shift the sail of
Canadian judicial review to accommodate a requirement of
consistency would in my view mean a radical alteration of our
present course in favour of one which implies a considerable risk
that both the administrative process and judicial review will
founder. The lure of imposing our personal understanding of
administrative consistency or reasonableness through the avenue of
judicial review must be resisted by lashing ourselves to the mast of
curial deference and by resorting to the alternate course of
non-judicial, political and logical pressure.

